Jean Baudrillard (1929 Baudrillard ( -2007 was a French philosopher, sociologist and media theorist representative of post-structuralist thought. He is most f amous f or his theory of simulation in contemporary culture as well as f or his theorizations of terrorism, both of which combined led him to the f ormulation of the provocative statement that "the Gulf War never took place." Baudrillard's suggestive and at times poetical style made him popular beyond academic circles, but also gained him the reputation of being a not very rigorous and scientif ic thinker. Gerry Coulter's book sheds light on these problems and shows that, in spite of a language that can appear untypical within academic discourse, Baudrillard's arguments remain sound.
Coulter teaches sociology at Bishop's University in Canada and is the editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, a journal which publishes serious and comprehensive scholarship on Baudrillard and his reception. T his certainly makes Coulter one of the main authorities in the f ield. Still the book is not technical at all, avoids any jargon, and should be interesting f or students and scholars f rom all f ields of the humanities.
Coulter reads Baudrillard through Baudrillard's own concepts and convictions, which are above all, his idea of theory as poetry and the reversibility of systems. Baudrillard is established by Coulter as a poet suspicious of empirical methods. Such accounts of Baudrillard might reaf f irm Baudrillard's reputation as a "non-serious" theorist, but still I am glad that Coulter spells out Baudrillard's position so clearly because it allows us to ref lect it against a larger spectrum of contemporary problems. T he book is straightf orward, combative, and radical with regard to both contents and method. Coulter quotes f rom f orty-f ive books by Baudrillard and uses only two secondary works. Obviously Coulter knows where he wants to go. Coulter divides the book into three thematic sections, but it seems to me that the book's structure works through a progressive highlighting of some of Baudrillard's ideas.
Baudrillard's principal idea -that of reversibility -is a model that can be detected as an underlying pattern intrinsic to post-modern culture. All systems based on techniques, science, and logic are bound to run empty sooner or later because technical perf ectionism kills the enigmatic surplus or the quantity of the "unknown" that philosophical investigations should maintain if they want to be interesting and f ruitf ul as philosophies and not merely as scientif ic accounts of realities. T he list of instances explaining how systems can be undone by their own systematicy is long: theory is killed by the "terrorism of meaning" enf orced by systematical and empirical studies; in universities, "perf ect" and overwhelming administrations kill education; the closer we approach events through "real time coverage" the more we are losing contact with the world's reality; because we are "overinf ormed" by the media we end up knowing nothing; the hysterical pursuit of security leads to insecurity; in cinema, perf ectionist digitalization and virtualization kill any sense of illusion; in architecture, computer-generated or visualized design produces a generic, over-perf ected quality that kills any sense of place; philosophy, once it has become so "perf ect" that it is restricted to logic and positivism, will no longer be meaningf ul as a philosophy; "Reversibility" is not an empirical f act; its existence cannot be supported by data. However, as a philosophical observation it remains conclusive. Coulter calls "poetical" what I would call philosophical but this is merely a choice of words: "what makes Baudrillard's thought poetic is his highly attenuated sense f or reversibility -the f act that all systems create the conditions of their own demise" (p. 1).
In any case, a poetic/philosophical view of the world is here opposed to a scientif ic one. T he question is: is the one who points out such possible or actual developments propagating a meaningless universe and radical relativism or is he merely detecting those moments of reversibility because his philosophical analysis yields such result? T he answer is easy. Of course, the nihilist does not invent the 'nihil' but he merely sees it and draws other peoples' attention to it. Still, many opponents of Baudrillard do not seem to understand this. A f ew times Coulter ref ers to "f undamentalists" (who can be of the religious, the analytico-scientif ic, or the Marxist variety). T hose f undamentalists want to kill the messenger because he points to an absurdity that is obvious, but which empirically minded scientists as well as ideologically blinded or f undamentally religious people do not want to or cannot admit. Coulter shows that f or Baudrillard, the task of philosophical thought "is to go to the limit of hypotheses and processes, even if they are catastrophic" (p. 27) and that he tries to live with it. It is not his blindness that leads him to a realization of the emptiness of the postmodern world, but his f earless search f or reality: "Baudrillard is f rustrated by his times -by what we gave up in cancelling our metaphysical contact and making another more perilous one with things" (p. 42) but contrary to f undamentalist, he does "not f ear the emptiness of the real" (p. 30). He "had watched the world drif t into delirium and it opened him to a delirious point of view" (p. 11) and this vision is "f ar better than the world of knowing which today is the world of the f undamentalists" (p. 22). T he f ollowing quotation appears several times in the book: "He acknowledged that living without truth is barely more tolerable than living with it -which would be a kind of f undamentalism as did Marxist thought f or most of the twentieth century" (p. 27).
T he radical consequence is that philosophy should not explain the world through technical systems but reinstate it in its most enigmatic f orm: "T he world is given to us as enigmatic and unintelligible -the task of thought, in his view, is not to add meaning to it but to make it more enigmatic and more unintelligible" (p.151, Impossible Exchange); philosophy should "remain as long as possible in the enigmatic, ambivalent, and reversible side of thought" (p.68 The Vital Illusion). T his does not mean that philosophy should blur reality and produce conf usion. On the contrary, it should point out and establish those unsolvable and enigmatic f eatures in the clearest fashion. T heory or philosophy should f unction not only like poetry, but also like photography, whose conceptualization Coulter explains very well in the book. T he task of photography is "to highlight and deepen an unintelligibility and enigmaticalness already present in a world which hides behind appearances." T his is why photography is, as Coulter shows with the help of a quotation f rom Barthes, "subversive not when it f rightens, repels, or even stigmatizes, but when it is pensive, when it thinks" (p.38 Camera Lucida).
